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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-NEPA-FDEALIZATION OF PROPOSED JOINT
FEDERAL/NON-FEDERAL PRoJECT-Homeowners Emergency Life Pro-
tection Committee v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976).
The 1971 earthquake in Southern California caused some legal trem-
ors for the City of Los Angeles. In an unearthshaking opinion five
years after the quake, the Ninth Circuit in Homeowners Emergency Life
Protection Committee v. Lynn' held that the federal grant of disaster
funds rendered the rebuilding of the Los Angeles Dam and Reservoir
a "major federal action" under the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA).2
NEPA requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS)8 for any project with a sufficient federal connection to be
included within the rubric "major federal action." Injunctive relief is
1. 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. The EIS is the core of NEPA. Often referred to as the "section 102 requirement,"
the statute states that all federal agencies must:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
a detailed statement by the responsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970) (emphasis added).
The EIS has been variously described as "a major legal advance in society's quest
for a better informed decision-making process," ABA NATURAL REsoURCEs LAW Sac-
TION, INTERDEPENDENcE--TnE LAW OF IER ENVIRONMENT 6 (1976), and by skeptical
environmentalists as "advertisements rather than objective and comprehensive scientific
studies," Preface to R. BtRCHELL & D. LISTOKN, Tim ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT HAND-
BOOK at 1 (1975).
In either event, the EIS is the crux of NEPA and compliance with the procedures
is the means of achieving the purposes of the Act. "NEPA does not require that a
project be abandoned if the agency's study shows the project will have a net adverse
impacL" D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AM CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOP-
mENT 971 (1973).
Some courts have suggested that substantive review of the merits of an agency deci-
sion is appropriate. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he language
of NEPA, as well as its legislative history make it clear that the Act is more than
an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended to effect substantive changes
in decisionmaking [sic]." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs,, 470 F.2d
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available to assure compliance. 4  Plaintiffs sought to enjoin 5 the city's
construction prior to the granting of funds on the theory that the city's
pre-funding activities sufficiently federalized the project to require the
preparation of an EIS.8 The district court ruled against the injunction
and, although plaintiffs appealed, the decision was delayed7 long
enough to render the issue of pre-funding activity moot.8 Since con-
struction had continued apace and the project was nearly completed,9
289, 297 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 ('1972). See Yarrington, NEPA, ENvR.
REP. (BNA), Monograph 17, 37-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Yarrington].
But most courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the agency.
They will uphold the agency decision if environmental procedures have been met and
there is substantial evidence to support the final decision.
4. An injunction will issue against the federal agency to assure compliance with fed-
eral law. In joint projects with state, local, or private parties, the federal party may
be the only one subject to injunction. "If the role of the federal government is
severed by injunction until an adequate EIS is prepared, the full directive of Congress
will have been met." City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578, 596
(E.D. Mich. 1975). However, when the federal agency works in concert with non-fed-
eral partners, the court can enjoin the non-federal party to the extent necessary to pre-
vent subversion of the EIS process by those parties. See Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287
(1st Cir. 1973).
5. Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 971 (C.D.
Cal. 1974), ajfd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976).
6. The project was uncontestably subject to state environmental law. The California
Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (CEQA), CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE ANN. §§ 21000-176
(West Supp. 1976), requires a similar environmental inquiry and documentation, the
Environmental Impact Report (EIR). As of January, 1975, thirty-two of the fifty states
had State Environmental Policy Acts (SEPA), mini-NEPAs with similar provisions.
See generally Hagman, NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defective?,
7 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1974); Tjossem, The Environmental Policy Acts: Analysis and
Application, 10 WiLLAMETTE L.J. 336 (1974); Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environ-
mental Policy Acts, 3 ENVm. L REP. 50,090 (1973).
Though NEPA may "impose no duties on the states and operate only upon federal
agencies," Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971), most state and local
agencies must still meet environmental obligations imposed by the applicable SEPA.
In California, the EIR requirement extends to private parties if a public agency
has some minimal link with the proposed activity, either by direct proprietary interest or
by permitting, regulating or funding private activity." Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 263, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1972).
7. The Ninth Circuit heard appellate argument in November, 1975; the EIS was com-
pleted in January, 1976; the decision to fund the project was made by the Federal Disas-
ter Assistance Administration (FDAA) in May, 1976; the court spoke in August, 1976.
541 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1976).
8. The court said simply:
Inasmuch as the grant of federal funds unquestionably moves the activity in issue
to the point of a federal-city partnership, the project is now a major federal action.
... As a result, it is unnecessary for this court to determine whether the city
appellees' request for federal funding and activities in connection with that request
transformed the dam project into a major federal action.
541 F.2d at 817 (citations omitted).
9. At the time of trial in the district court, the project was less than half complete; at
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the larger policy issue of the need for and the requirement of an
adequate EIS was also moot10 by the time the Ninth Circuit spoke. By
delaying, the court was able to avoid the difficult issue of when a project
becomes federal action in a case where a non-federal party proceeding
on a project will inevitably be joined by a federal agency. By not
finding federal action early enough, a court allows a non-federal party
to subvert the policy behind NEPA, either by foreclosing options or by
damaging the environment before a formal federal partnership mate-
rializes.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
In the wake of the 1971 earthquake, the Los Angeles Dam and
Reservoir was declared a major disaster by the President pursuant to the
Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1970.11 The city applied for disaster
relief funds to help in rebuilding the facility, which was planned for
operation at half the capacity of the former reservoir on a more suitable
seismic and geologic part of the 1600 acre city-owned site. For nearly
three years, the city worked with federal agencies,' 2 the controlling state
the time of hearing on appeal, it was seventy percent complete; by the time of decision
seven months later, it was ninety percent complete. Interview with K. W. Downey,
attorney for City Appellees, in Los Angeles (Mar. 10, 1977). Courts have halted
"ongoing projects" in the midst of construction. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task
Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458
F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Morningside-Lennox Park
Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364
(D.S.D. 1971).
The Warm Springs Dam project was halted after more than $35,000,000 had been
spent. Enjoining further work until the court of appeals could consider the adequacy
of the EIS, Justice Douglas spoke strongly about enforcing NEPA: "The tendency has
been to downgrade this mandate of Congress, to use shortcuts to the desired end, and
to present impact statements after a project has been started, when there is already
such momentum that it is difficult to stop." Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,
supra at 1309.
But the economic hardship of an injunction and the degree to which resources have
already been invested in a project affect the federal court's balancing of the equities
in its decision to grant or deny such relief. "At some stage of progress, the costs of
altering or abandoning the project could so definitely outweigh whatever benefits that
might accrue therefrom that it might no longer be 'possible' to change the project in
accordance with Section 102." Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, supra at 1331.
10. Although the legal battle continued, all practical recourse for plaintiffs had been
foreclosed. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the adequacy
of the EIS prepared by the FDAA. With the project near completion, the EIS could
have little actual value to the plaintiffs.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4401 et seq. (1970).
12. The City of Los Angeles had the technical assistance of the Army Corps of
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agency,1 8 and special consultants14 to clear the project for its state
permit. A construction contract was awarded by the city in late 1974
and construction began with local money and the hope of federal
reimbursement. 15
The owners of homes in the vicinity of the dam and reservoir
brought suit in district court.16 They argued that the city's application
for federal assistance, work with federal technical consultants, and
conformity of plans to federal agency specifications constituted a city-
federal relationship sufficient to transform the local project into federal
action. The city defendants argued, inter alia,.7 that the project was
neither federalized by mere application for federal funds, nor by joint
planning, nor by anything less than an actual commitment of funds.
Until funds were committed, it was a local project, funded locally and
not subject to federal environmental law.18  The trial court adopted
the defendants' argument and denied the injunction. 9
Actual federal funding unquestionably federalizes an otherwise non-
federal project.20  What is unclear is whether actions taken by the
federal government prior to that point can federalize a project for
purposes of NEPA.2' If so, what actions are sufficient? These unre-
solved questions, only partially disposed of by early cases on pre-
Engineers and the United States Geological Survey. Brief for City Appellee at 10,
Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.
1976).
13. The state agency responsible for construction of dams is the California State De-
partment of Water Resources, Division of Safety of Dams. CAL. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 6000 et seq. (West 1971).
14. Charles A. Richter of the California Institute of Technology was one of the spe-
cial consultants on the project. Brief for City Appellee at Exhibit K. Homeowners
Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976). The EIR
was prepared pursuant to CEQA, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN. § 21000 et seq. (West
Supp. 1976).
15. The city contended throughout the litigation that the project would be funded
through local revenue bonds if federal money was ultimately denied. Brief for City
Appellee at 27, Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814,
815 (9th Cir. 1976).
16. 388 F. Supp. 971 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
17. The defendants' second argument, retroactive application of an exemption under
section 405 of the Federal Disaster Assistance Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5175 (Supp.
V, 1975), was accepted by the trial court, 388 F. Supp. at 977, but was rejected by
the appellate court, 541 F.2d at 817.
18. 388 F. Supp. at 980.
19. The court stated that "there can be only one point in the 'process' of Federal
aid decision-making here at which a 'major Federal action' can be said to take place-
at the point of actual allocation of funds. And there has been no such allocation here."
Id. at 975.
20. 40 C.F.R. 1500.5(a)(2) (1976).
21. NEPA applies with equal force to a federal "lease, permit, license certificate or
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partnership status,2 2 and inadequately addressed by administrative guide-
lines,2 affect the interests of the myriad state and private parties who
enter into various relationships with the federal government.24 It is an
issue most likely to arise when federal aid is on a reimbursement system,
because the non-federal party wants to proceed free of NEPA, yet later
receive federal reimbursement for the outlay. Standards are needed to
"provide for the reasonable expectations of the parties '25 from the time
the project first assumes discernible form through early phases of the
planning process prior to funding.
This casenote will examine case law on what constitutes a federal
project, the pre-federal joint project problem that the Ninth Circuit
avoided, and alternative resolutions the court might have reached.
If. BACKGROUND--NEPA LiTIGATION
A. Early Cases Develop a NEPA Common Law
NEPA applies to "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, '2 6 but the terms major and federal
and action are not precise. The Supreme Court has characterized the
other entitlement for use." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a) (2) (1976). For a discussion of
types of federal activity to which NEPA applies, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE
CouRTs 57-61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
22. See Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d
254 (1st Cir. 1972).
23. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued guidelines in 1973 which
direct the agencies to "include in their procedures provisions limiting actions which an
applicant is permitted to take prior to completion and review of the final statement
with respect to his application." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(a) (1976). This is sound admin-
istrative advice in response to the plea for status quo regulations in Silva v. Romney,
473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973). However, by the language of the guidelines, reluctant
agencies cannot be forced to issue such regulations.
24. To gain perspective on the number of such relationships under the new federalism,
consider the combined effect of all federal aid, all leases on federally owned lands and
all permits granted under direct federal regulatory power. All such activities, if deemed
major and action significantly affecting the environment, would be deemed federal.
NEPA may not reach the other party prior to federal approval. Gage v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80 (N.D. Ill. 1972). NEPA, however, does reach the other
party at some point during the development of the relationship. The particular prob-
lem in an aid context is that the recipient is reimbursed for his outlay after the project is
underway or completed. Damage may already have been wrought or options fore-
closed before NEPA is deemed to apply. This is the problem posed by Homeowners,
Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972), and the highway cases. See text accom-
panying notes 63-94 infra.
25. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 291 (1st Cir. 1973).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
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statute as "a catalyst for development of a 'common law' of NEPA. ' '27
A rigorous reading of congressional intent28 in early NEPA cases 29
accounts for the fact that most actions challenged as coming within the
purview of the Act have been held to be major and federal and actions
with significant environmental effects."' In the voluminous environ-
mental litigation since 1970,31 the courts have made it clear that provi-
sions of the Act "establish a strict standard of compliance"32 and that an
injunction is the method of enforcing the standard.-"
B. The Finding of Federal Status-The Easy Cases
The Act by its own terms applies to "every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions . . .,.
The regulations define "actions" as including, but not limited to,
projects "[dlirectly undertaken by Federal agencies; or supported in
whole or in part through Federal contracts, grants . . . ; or involv-
ing a Federal lease, permit, license certificate or other entitlement
for use." 85
When a federal agency directly undertakes its own construction activi-
ty, a federal action is most easily found. 6 NEPA has also been
27. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2735 (1976).
28. The House conference on NEPA said that "it is the intent of the conferees that
the provision 'to the fullest extent possible' shall not be used by any Federal agency
as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102." H.R.
REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969).
29. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. Yarrington, supra note 3, at 22-23.
31. For a summary of the 231 decisions as of September 1, 1973, see NEPA Court
Decisions, 102 MoNrroR, Oct. 1973, at 2.
32. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. "[F]ailure to comply [with NEPA] .. .is basis for an injunction." Bradford
Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 539 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972). For a discussion of the application of injunctions and
exceptions to the issuing of a blanket injunction, see ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 244-
45.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(2) (1976). The CEQ requires each federal agency to
prepare its own guidelines. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Commission, 10 C.F.R. § 11 et
seq. (1975); Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 6.100 et seq. (1976).
36. When federal agencies such as the Post Office, the Corps of Engineers, the Forest
Service or the armed services provide services or undertake construction progams, the
"courts do not normally discuss whether the federal presence is sufficient; it is assumed
to exist." ANDERsoN, supra note 21, at 58.
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routinely applied when the federal agency regulates a non-federal party's
power to affect the environment, such as the AEC's licensing power over
a utilities project .'7 Even more indirectly, an agency decision to spon-
sor research has been held subject to NEPA because the results might
ultimately affect congressional legislation or appropriations.,s8
The critical determination in joint projects involving federal funding
or permission has been the presence of an identifiable action or commit-
ment by the federal agency. 9 If such circumstances were present, it
would have been safe to predict that "where the Federal Government is
involved in a project in any way, no matter how slight its involvement,
that project will more than likely be considered a 'federal action' within
the meaning of NEPA."40
C. The Finding of Non-Federal Status of a Project
Despite the existence of some federal presence, courts have carved out
exceptions to the legislative dictate that an EIS is required for all major
federal actions. Although no excuse for footdragging4l is allowed
once NEPA is deemed applicable, there is a range of excuses for not
applying it in the first instance.
1. NEPA Requirements in Conflict with Existing Law
Aside from a few express statutory exclusions, 42 there are judicial
exceptions where NEPA's requirements are in direct conflict with
37. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See also Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1971). An interesting question is posed by the trust position the United States
Government holds with regard to Indian leases. See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593
(10th Cir. 1972).
38. See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), which involved funding for research on the fast breeder nuclear reactor.
39. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Silva v.
Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973). In a recent Ninth Circuit case, the court
focused on the contract entered into between the Bonneville Power Administration, a
federal agency, and a proposed magnesium plant to supply power and construct the
transmission line to the plant. This contract federalized the entire project and required
an environmental impact statement under NEPA. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir. 1976).
40. Yarrington, supra note 3, at 22.
41. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
("this language [of NEPAl does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies").
42. General Revenue Sharing Fund projects are excluded by 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)
(2) (1976). Other statutory exclusions in subsequent acts of Congress include actions
under the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) (Supp. II
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existing law.4" In United States v. SCRAP, 44 the Supreme Court stated
that "NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other
statute." 45 That proposition was at the center of the Court's most re-
cent holding in Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Associa-
tion.46 In that case, the Scenic Rivers Association sought to force
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to pre-
pare an EIS before allowing a private real estate developer's disclosure
statement (pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act)47
to become effective. The Association claimed that HUD's review
of the disclosure statement was a major federal action.48 The Court
held that because HUD could not simultaneously comply with NEPA
and the Disclosure Act, the NEPA requirement was not applicable.
The Court stressed that "NEPA's instruction that all federal agencies
comply with [EIS requirements] 'to the fullest extent possible' is neither
accidental nor hyperbolic."4
2. Insufficient Nexus Between Federal and Non-Federal Parties
A second means by which courts have refused to find a project
federal is by finding an insufficient nexus between the federal and
non-federal parties. The requirements of NEPA will apply to a non-
federal actor only where federal authority is present and directly related
to the non-federal defendant. For example, where a plaintiff sought to
halt zoning changes in a seashore municipality on the basis that the
1973), and under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). Clean Air Act projects
are exempted by the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 793(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1975).
43. Judicial exceptions include: (1) certain actions of the Environmental Protection
Agency, see Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973); Appala-
chian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); (2) federal actions
involving national security and military installations, see Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971); (3) actions by temporary agencies
and emergency action, see Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973);
Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In Kings County Economic Community Dev. Ass'n. v. Hardin, 478 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1973), conflict was found between the purposes of NEPA and those of section
1307 of the Agriculture Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. (1970), when the plaintiffs
unsuccessfully sought to force the federal agency to deny farm subsidies, mandatory
under the Act, to users of pesticides and fertilizers.
44. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
45. Id. at 694.
46. 96 S. Ct. 2430 (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq. (1970).
48. 96 S. CL at 2435.
49. Id. at 2437 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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National Seashore Act5 ° was created to preserve the seashore property,
an injunction was denied.51 Under that Act, the Secretary of Interior's
authority was limited to the condemnation of a certain property along
the seashore. 2  No connection was found between the role of the
Secretary and the actions of the local zoning officials.Y8
A closer connection, though still insufficient, was presented in anoth-
er case.54 Property was condemned by the City of New York for use by
a private paper machinery business. To finance its expansion, the
business received a federal loan,55 which concededly could have been
a major federal action. However, because the city was not the bene-
ficiary of the loan, its actions were not subject to an injunction. 0
In both examples, federal authority was present but not directly
related to the non-federal action. Therefore, federal presence in a
connected but separate action is insufficient to constitute federal action.
3. Federal and Non-Federal Parts of Severable Project
A third method courts have used in dealing with a partially federal
project is severing the non-federal part from an otherwise concededly
federal project. 5 7 Cases suggest that the federal status of a project is not
an all-or-nothing proposition. Federal involvement can be partial 8
50. Fire Island National Seashore Act of 1952, 16 U.S.C. § 459e et seq. (1970).
51. Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 1148.
53. Id. at 1147.
54. Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. The private party received money under the United States Economic Development
Administration with the Department of Commerce. Id. at 1147.
56. The court stated that because "the expansion project could proceed independently
of the EDA loan, . . . the City's condemnation and possession of [the] site [did] not
legally rely on the EDA loan commitment." Id. at 1148.
57. This argument has failed in the highway context. See San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
933 (1972); text accompanying notes 63-78 infra.
58. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975), which
involved a challenge to the expansion and development of the San Francisco Airport.
It was urged that federal action be recognized on the basis of layout approval from
the Federal Aviation Administration and promise of future funding. The court
granted an injunction against the federally-funded parts of the expansion program, but
it denied an injunction against the state-funded terminal and parking garage projects.
These "state funded projects are not so closely interwoven with those receiving federal
funds to make the entire airport development program the relevant 'action' for NEPA
purposes." Id. at 327.
Similar reasoning, but a less clear factual application, is found in City of Romulus
v. County of Wayne, 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975), involving runway expansion
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and, in one instance, it was held to be revocable.,9 Also, federal fund-
ing solely for planning may not involve the government to a sufficient
degree to federalize a project.60
4. Federal Agency Involvement Terminated
Finally, NEPA has been held inapplicable in HUD cases where long-
term redevelopment projects began before the effective date of the Act,
and the federal agency could no longer affect changes in the plans.61 In
these cases the focus is on "when significant federal action last took
place."62
D. Finding Federal Status-The Highway Cases
At the other end of the spectrum are the pre-partnership situations in
which the focus is on when significant federal action first takes place.
6 3
These are most heavily litigated in the highway cases. In order to
understand how and when a highway project becomes federalized, it
is essential to know the administrative procedures of the federal aid
of the Detroit Airport, where the court concluded:
There was no evidence presented, aside from the grant provisions and the prep-
aration of the EIS itself, as to the role of the federal government in the project.
The Court cannot, therefore, conclude that the project is sufficiently 'federal' in
toto to warrant a blanket injunction. NEPA does not encompass local or state
projects affecting the environment. If the role of the federal government is severed
by injunction until an adequate EIS is prepared, the full directive of Congress will
have been met.
Id. at 596 (citation omitted).
59. See Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974). In the first round of litigation,
NEPA had been held to be applicable to the federal agency, Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971); however, the court held that a subsequent reimbursement of funds
to the federal government defederalized the project. 497 F.2d at 257. For a criticism
of the court's finding of defederalization, see Comment, Injunctions, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Fourth Circuit's Chimera of Revocability, 60
IOWAL. Rv. 362 (1974).
60. See River v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973). But see Pacific Legal Foundation v. Bums, Civil No.
76-1153 (C.D. Cal., filed Sept. 10, 1976), - F. Supp. - (C.D. Cal. 1976), where the
court rejected the argument that the federal investigative aspects of the controversial Los
Angeles diamond lane experiment could be severed from the non-federal operational
aspects. Id. at 28, 31-33, - F. Supp. at -, -
61. See, e.g., Chick v. Hills, 528 F.2d 445 (1st Cir. 1976); Molokai Homesteaders
Coop. Ass'n v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885
(1st Cir. 1973); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. Jones v. Lynn, 354 F. Supp. 433, 444 (D. Mass.), vacated, 477 F.2d 885 (1st
Cir. 1973).
63. For cases which discuss the joint state-federai highway planning process, see
Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Thompson v. Fugate, 452 F.2d 57
(4th Cir. 1971). Courts in a few cases have said that tentative allocation in the early
planning stages of a highway project was insufficient to federalize a project, but they
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highway system. The Federal-Interstate Highway Program statutory
scheme and agency directives 64 result in a uniquely fragmented system
of approvals. 65
First, state highway officials must obtain program approval from the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Without such approval, a
state may not undertake work "even with its own funds, on any project
for which it ultimately may receive federal reimbursement." '  Each
program approval relates exclusively to individual projects and is submit-
ted on a separate form.67 This application includes, among other
things, location of the project on an approved federal-aid system.08
Next, the state officials must submit plans, specifications, and estimates
for each project in the approved program.69 Once these are approved,
the federal and state agencies enter into an agreement authorizing the
work .70 After advertising for bids and awarding contracts, construc-
tion finally proceeds under the supervision of the state highway depart-
ment. Thereafter, reimbursement occurs.
Early cases made it clear that a highway project constituted federal
action at the point where the state sought approval7' so long as federal
funds eventually might be provided. 72  The problem has been one of
timing. The project should be federalized early enough so that state
action can be enjoined before "deleterious effects upon the environment
have actually occurred. . .. ,,71 However, a court may not be willing
to stop a project if "it has reached the stage of progress where costs of
are contra to the vast majority of highway cases. See Bradford Township v. Illinois
State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047
(1973); Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972); Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Northeast Area Wel-
fare Rights Organization v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C. 1705 (E.D. Wash. 1970).
64. 23 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1970); 23 C.F.R. § 1.1 et'seq. (1976).
65. See ANmERsoN, supra note 21, at 158-76.
66. Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administrative Pro-
cedures and Judicial Interpretation, 2 ENvm. L. REP. 50,001, 50,008 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Peterson & Kennan].
67. Policy and Procedure Memorandum 21-1(5) (Feb. 2, 1962), f 8a, Statutes &
Regulations, ENvrR. L. REP. 46,513 (1976), amending, Policy and Procedure Memoran-
dum 21-1 (Apr. 15, 1958).
68. 23 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1970).
69. Id. § 106(a). The section further provides that "[The Secretary's] approval of
any such project shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the Federal Government
for the payment of its proportional contribution thereto." Id,
70. See Peterson & Kennan, supra note 66, at 50,008.
71. See Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
72. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 227 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
73. Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
[Vol. 10
19771 RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
altering or abandoning the proposed route would certainly outweigh
whatever benefits might accrue [from applying NEPA . ...
It is rarely too early to apply NEPA in a highway context75 because
the statutory scheme which guides the behavior of state and federal
agencies in partnership makes location approval requisite to, and virtual-
ly tantamount to, later funding. 76  It is rarely too late to apply NEPA if
there is any critical or substantial action yet to be taken.7 7  Severability
arguments fail because of the interconnected nature of all parts of a
highway system. Moreover, once a highway project is funded, the
courts have not allowed a state agency to defederalize it by removing
federal funds from a projeet.
78
III. PROBLEMS WITH TENTATIVE ALLOCATION
In contrast to the highway projects in which federal action is found in
the earliest stages, Boston v. Volpe79 and Homeowners Emergency Life
Protection Committee v. Lynns° represent difficult cases of tentative
allocation. In these cases the local sponsor denied binding entangle-
ments or permanent commitments with the federal agency. A binding
74. Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th Cir. 1972).
The consideration of balancing the benefits of applying NEPA against the losses to
be incurred touches upon the related issue of the retroactive application of the Act.
For cases in which it was clearly too late to apply NEPA, see, e.g., Pizitz, Inc. v.
Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.
1972).
75. When the states have tried to evade NEPA by not requesting federal aid for
some separate segments of a highway project, the courts have rejected the device, using
various grounds: the segment marked "non-federal" is an integral part of an otherwise
federal project, Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Va. 1972); the option
to seek federal aid still remains open and the states cannot have the benefits of both
possible funding and freedom from federal law, La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp.
221, 231 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1971); allowing the state to proceed "would make a sham
of the reconsideration required by federal law," Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe,
458 F.2d 1323, 1328 (4th Cir. 1972); the federal defendants had acquiesced in trying
to create the appearance of ineligibility for further federal aid, Sierra Club v. Volpe,
351 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1972); the state may not subvert NEPA "by a
mere change in bookkeeping or by shifting funds from one project to another, San An-
tonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 1971).
76. Cf. Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1976); Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). See text accompany-
ing notes 79-94 infra.
77. See ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 167-74 and ca-es cited therein.
78. San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (Cth
Cir. 1971). Contra, Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974).
79. 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
80. 541 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1976).
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and permanent relationship was solemnized only upon the transfer of
money.
In Boston, plaintiffs tried to enjoin the Massachusetts Port Authority
from continuing work on the Waterfront Outer Taxiway at Logan
Airport."' Construction had already begun when the case was heard.
Reviewing entanglements of the federal and non-federal actors in the
project, the court rejected four pre-funding activities as insufficient to
federalize the project. The activities were: (1) adoption of federal
specifications in order to qualify for aid; (2) previous federal aid to
another part of the project; (3) an intention on the part of the Port
Authority to seek funds at a future time for another stretch of taxiway;
and (4) most importantly, tentative allocation of funds.82 Unlike high-
way location approval, which is normally final, tentative allocation of
funds for airport projects is preliminary in nature and will be scrutinized
closely again before funds are awarded.83 This, the court reasoned,
does not federalize a project. 4
In Homeowners, plaintiffs' primary argument in the trial court was
that joint planning and conformity to federal requirements in the
hope of eventually securing federal funding formed the basis of an
"ongoing relationship" between city and federal defendants.88 The
court distinguished the highway cases and held that reimbursement for
the dam reconstruction, like the airport aid in Boston, was a single
decision, and only when it was final would there be "major federal
action."86 Further, an analogy could not be made to highway location
approval because the federal agency had not approved the location of
the dam.87
Plaintiffs also argued a partnership in the dam reconstruction similar
to the one found in Silva v. Romney,88 where HUD had not granted
money but had a 180 day commitment with a private developer for a
housing project. The developer was enjoined from cutting trees prior to
HUD's preparation of an EIS.89 In Homeowners, the district court
rejected the partnership argument on the basis that there had not been
81. 464 F.2d at 256-57.
82. Id. at 258.
83. Id. at 259.
84. Id.
85. 388 F. Supp. at 973-74.
86. Id. at 975.
87. Id.
88. 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
89. Id. at 289-90. The private developer received a 180 day commitment for a mort-
gage guarantee and an interest grant from HUD. However, the court focused on the
overall relationship between the parties rather than solely on the contract. Id. at 290-91.
[Vol. 10
RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
even tentative approval for funding of the dam, let alone a contract
between the parties."0
When the Ninth Circuit heard argument in Homeowners, both the
"ongoing relationship" analogy to the highway cases and the "part-
nership" analogy to HUD's agreement with a private party in Silva were
ripe for discussion. The court could have upheld the district courts
finding, based on Boston, that an actual allocation of funds was neces-
sary for federalization. Alternatively the court could have carved out
standards for finding that a proposed, but inevitable, federal project is
federal prior to any actual allocation. It was an unattractive alterna-
tive. If an injunction were issued, it would halt a thirty-three million
dollar project more than half-way to completion. If an injunction were
denied because the project was not yet federal, the court would have
to confront the reality that "federal involvement may not develop until
after environmentally prejudicial steps have already occurred during a
preliminary non-federal planning phase."91 The Ninth Circuit avoided
the dilemma by waiting until funds were granted and transferred to the
city's account, at which point it was not necessary to step into the
thicket of pre-partnerships, ongoing relationships, or tacit or implied
agreements as bases for federalizing a project.
The Second Circuit in Silva had stepped into that thicket and
emerged confessing "to a sense of growing uneasiness in seeing decisions
determining the obligations of federal and non-federal parties under
NEPA turn on any one interim step in the development of the partner-
ship between the parties."92 The Silva court had resisted a mechanical
application of the rule that only an actual allocation or a contract can
federalize a project. It had perceived the 180 day agreement between
HUD and the developer as "but one manifestation of and quite irrele-
vant to an ongoing planning process by all parties to the project which
must provide for the reasonable expectations of the parties."9 3 The
Silva opinion contained a strong plea for administrative guidelines to
provide a pre-partnership regulatory scheme so that "courts can play a
more structured role in environmental cases."94
90. 388 F. Supp. at 975. The focus on the contractual relationship between the fed-
eral and non-federal parties is rooted in the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). See also Sierra Club v.
Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FE.amIA ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 238, 346 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
92. 473 F.2d at 290.
93. Id. at 290-91.
94. Id. at 292.
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IV. STRUCTURING THE COURT'S ROLE IN
DETERMINING FEDERAL STATUS
Even if the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 9" had tried to
develop guidelines for the courts, it could only list the factors to be
considered in determining the federal status of a proposed project. No
catalogue of projects and relationships could account for all even-
tualities. In assessing the federal-state relationship, a court would still
have to look to all "the facts and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom." 96 Administrative rules cannot be expected to pro-
vide an easy litmus test for the wide range of facts that come before the
court. There will be a reiteration of the mandate to comply "to the
fullest extent possible.1 97
The courts have evolved some standards on their own with varying
clarity. The most satisfactory factors have been those that are objec-
tively measurable. They include the degree of federal power to im-
plement or alter a project, the nexus between federal and non-federal
parts of a project, and the enforceability of a federal promise to a non-
federal actor.
The least satisfactory of the factors to be considered is the intention or
expectation9" of the non-federal actor in seeking federal aid or permis-
sion. In finding that the project was not yet federal, both the First Cir-
cuit in Boston99 and the district court in Homeowners ee noted the ability
and intention of the non-federal party to proceed, if necessary, without
federal funds. The non-federal defendant was in .the anomalous posi-
95. See note 23 supra. The CEQ is comprised of three persons, selected by the Presi-
dent, with whom all impact statements are filed. They are qualified
to analyze and interpret environmental trends and information of all kinds; to ap-
praise programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy
set forth in subchapter I of this chapter; to be conscious of and responsive to the
scientific, economic, social, esthetic and cultural needs and interests of the Nation;
and to formulate and recommend national policies to promote the improvement
of the quality of the environment. -
42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). For a discussion of the need for regulations in this area,
see Brown, Applying NEPA to Joint Federal and Non-Federal Projects, 4 ENvr'L AFF.
135 (1975).
96. Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Va. 1972).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
98. See Citizens for a Balanced Environment and Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F. Supp.
806 (D. Conn. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975), where the court said that
"determination of whether the federal government is sufficiently involved in a highway
to make it a 'Federal action' within the meaning of NEPA should not depend on the
state of mind of a potential state applicant for funds." Id. at 812.
99. 464 F.2d at 259.
100. 388 F. Supp. at 974.
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"ion of disclaiming dependefice on federal funds to defeat the injunc-
tion while trying to persuade the federal agency that federal aid was
vital to the local project. The interests of the party as a defendant in
federal court ran directly counter to the interests of the party as an
applicant for federal funds.
V. -CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVES TO MOOTNESS
SWhen the Ninth Circuit heard Homeowners, it had the opportunity to
address the pre-partnership federal issue with the benefit of the judicial
experience accumulated since Boston. 0 1 - It could have resolved the
issue in one of two ways.
The court might have stated unequivocally that an enforceable com-
mitment by the federal agency (actual grant of funds or permit) is the
single act that can federalize a project. It might have reasoned that the
ongoing relationship rationale of the highway cases"' does not apply to
agencies or projects which lack the statutory scheme and entangled
history of the state-federal highway system. This could be justified as
offering a manageable formula for agency decision and court review. It
is a rule that all parties can understand, and by its clarity, might lessen
litigation.
Alternatively, the court could have insisted on looking through the
form to the substance of the relationship. The court could have iden-
tified a class of inevitably federal projects. These would be
a narrow class of cases-essentially those where both the likelihood
of eventual agency action and the danger posed by nonpreparation
of an environmental impact statement were great-in which it would
allow judicial intervention prior to the time at which -an impact state-
ment must be ready. [This approach keeps sight of] the inadequacy
of other remedies and the narrowness of the category constructed. 03
If the court had found that the mandate of NEPA would be better
met by triggering federal environmental review before a non-federal
party could act, then standards would have to be established to distin-
guish between merely possible partnerships and highly probable ones.
101. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 63-78 supra.
103. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2733 (Marshall & Brennan, J.., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the lower court's denial of injunction and granting of summary judg-
ment to the defendants on the issue of whether a regionwide, comprehensive EIS was
required before the Department of Interior could grant permission to develop coal re-
serves on federally-owned land in the Northern Great Plains. Id.
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The plaintiff would have the burden'0 4 of persuading the court that if
the marriage had not already been consummated, it most surely would
be. The showing could be based on the agency track record with that
particular kind of project, its statutory mandate and regulatory scheme;
or, the showing could be rooted in the nature of the project itself, i.e., its
inherent dependence on federal action for completion. An extension of
the term "federal action" to pre-federal action could have been justified
as being consistent with NEPA's intention to force environmental review
before environmentally prejudicial steps have been taken.
The Ninth Circuit could have promoted the goals of NEPA by ex-
panding the concept of federal project or promoted the cause of pre-
dictability by narrowing the definition. It chose to do neither, thereby
leaving prospective litigants still unsure as to whether the highway
rationale is limited to highways or -whether an "inevitably federal" argu-
ment will work in other contexts. To a party looking for guidance,
Homeowners provides no help.
Julie Pressman Downey
104. Most cases which have addressed the question of burden of proof have placed
it where it traditionally rests, on the plaintiff. However, in Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971), the court placed the burden on the federal government. Another
view was expressed in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973):
[O]nce a prima facie showing has been made that the federal agency has failed
to adhere to the requirements of NEPA, the burden must, as a general rule, be
laid upon this same agency which has the labor and public resources to make the
proper environmental assessment and support it by a preponderance of the evidence
contained in the impact statement.
Id. at 1335.
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